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EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON THE LATTICE: PAYOFFS
AFFECTING BIRTH AND DEATH RATES
By N. Lanchier1
Arizona State University
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the frame-
work of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice
is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible
strategies and is attributed a payoff based on her strategy, the strat-
egy of her neighbors and a payoff matrix. Following the traditional
approach of evolutionary game theory, this payoff is interpreted as a
fitness: the dynamics of the system is derived by thinking of positive
payoffs as birth rates and the absolute value of negative payoffs as
death rates. The nonspatial mean-field approximation obtained un-
der the assumption that the population is well mixing is the popular
replicator equation. The main objective is to understand the con-
sequences of the inclusion of local interactions by investigating and
comparing the phase diagrams of the spatial and nonspatial models
in the four dimensional space of the payoff matrices. Our results in-
dicate that the inclusion of local interactions induces a reduction of
the coexistence region of the replicator equation and the presence of
a dominant strategy that wins even when starting at arbitrarily low
density in the region where the replicator equation displays bistabil-
ity. We also discuss the implications of these results in the parameter
regions that correspond to the most popular games: the prisoner’s
dilemma, the stag hunt game, the hawk-dove game and the battle of
the sexes.
1. Introduction. The book of von Neumann and Morgenstern [31] that
develops mathematical methods to understand human behavior in strategic
and economic decisions is the first foundational work in the field of game
theory. The most popular games are symmetric two-person games whose
characteristics are specified by a square matrix where the common number
of rows and columns denotes the number of possible pure strategies, and the
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coefficients represent the player’s payoffs which depend on both her strategy
and the strategy of her opponent. Game theory relies on the assumption that
players are rational decision-makers. In particular, the main question in this
field is: what is the best possible response against a player who tries to maxi-
mize her payoff? The work of Nash [23] on the existence of Nash equilibrium,
a mathematical criterion for mutual consistency of players’ strategies, is an
important contribution that gives a partial answer to this question.
In contrast, the field of evolutionary game theory, which was proposed
by theoretical biologist Maynard Smith and first appeared in his work with
Price [22], does not assume that players make rational decisions: evolution-
ary game theory makes use of concepts from traditional game theory to
describe the dynamics of populations by thinking of individuals as interact-
ing players and their trait as a strategy, and by interpreting their payoff as a
fitness or reproduction success. The analog of Nash equilibrium in evolution-
ary game theory is called ESS, a short for evolutionary stable strategy, and is
defined as a strategy which, if adopted by a population, cannot be invaded
by any alternative strategy starting at an infinitesimally small frequency.
This key concept first appeared in the foundational work [22]. Even though
evolutionary games were originally introduced to understand the outcome
of animal conflicts, they now have a wide variety of applications as a pow-
erful framework to study interacting populations in which the reproductive
success of each individual is density dependent, a key component of social
and biological communities.
The inclusion of stochasticity and space in the form of local interactions is
another key factor in how communities are shaped, and evolutionary games
have been studied through both the mathematical analysis of determin-
istic nonspatial models based on differential equations and simulations of
more complex models based on spatial stochastic processes. For a review on
deterministic nonspatial evolutionary games, we refer to [15]. On the side
of spatial stochastic evolutionary games, one important contribution is the
work of Nowak and May [28, 29] which, based on simulations of cellular
automata, shows that space favors cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma.
See also [26, 27] for similar works based on asynchronous updating models,
[25] for a review on spatial evolutionary games and [13, 19] and references
therein for more recent work on the topic. The rigorous analysis of nonspa-
tial deterministic models and simulations of spatial stochastic models are
both important and complementary but also have some limitations: spatial
simulations suggest that nonspatial models fail to appropriately describe
systems, including local interactions, but are known at the same time to
be difficult to interpret, leading sometimes to erroneous conclusions. This
underlines the necessity of an analytical study of evolutionary games based
on stochastic spatial models. References [4, 6, 7] are, as far as we know, the
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON THE LATTICE 3
only three articles that also carry out a rigorous analysis of such models but
the authors’ approach significantly differs from ours: they assume that
fitness = (1−w) +w× payoff and w→ 0,
which is referred to as weak selection and allows for a complete analytical
treatment using voter model perturbation techniques. Indeed, for w = 0,
their model reduces to the popular voter model introduced in [5, 16]. In
contrast, we assume that fitness = payoff, which makes our model mathe-
matically more challenging and does not allow for a complete analysis. How-
ever, the limiting behavior in different parameter regions can be understood
based on various techniques, which leads to interesting findings about the
consequences of the inclusion of local interactions. For a similar approach,
we also refer to [12] where the best-response dynamics, a spatial process in
which players update their strategy at a constant rate in order to maximize
their payoff, is studied.
The replicator equation. As previously mentioned, most of the analyt-
ical works in evolutionary game theory are based on ordinary differential
equations. The most popular model that falls into this category is the repli-
cator equation, which we describe for simplicity in the presence of only two
strategies since this is the case under consideration for the stochastic spatial
model we introduce later. The dynamics depends on a 2× 2 payoff matrix
A = (aij) where aij denotes the payoff of a player who follows strategy i
interacting with a player who follows strategy j. To formulate the replicator
equation and describe its bifurcation diagram, it is convenient to use the
terminology introduced by the author in [17] by setting
a1 := a11 − a21 and a2 := a22 − a12
and declaring strategy i to be:
• altruistic when ai < 0, that is, a player with strategy i confers a lower
payoff to a player following the same strategy than to a player following
the other strategy,
• selfish when ai > 0, that is, a player with strategy i confers a higher payoff
to a player following the same strategy than to a player following the other
strategy.
The replicator equation is a system of coupled differential equations for the
frequency ui of players following strategy i. The payoff of each type i player
is given by
φi = φi(u1, u2) := ai1u1 + ai2u2 for i= 1,2.(1)
Interpreting this payoff as the growth rate of each type i player, using that
the frequencies sum up to one, and recalling the definition of a1 and a2, one
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obtains the following ordinary differential equation, the so-called replicator
equation, for the frequency of type 1 players:
u′1(t) = u1u2(φ1 − φ2) = u1u2(a11u1 + a12u2 − a21u1 − a22u2)
(2)
= u1u2(a1u1 − a2u2) = u1(1− u1)((a1 + a2)u1 − a2).
The system has three fixed points, namely
e1 := 1 and e2 := 0 and e12 := a2(a1 + a2)
−1,
and basic algebra shows that the limiting behavior only depends on the sign
of a1 and a2, therefore on whether strategies are altruistic or selfish. More
precisely, we find that:
• when strategy 1 is selfish and strategy 2 altruistic, strategy 1 wins: e12 /∈
(0,1) and starting from any initial condition u1(0) ∈ (0,1), u1→ e1.
• when strategy 1 is altruistic and strategy 2 selfish, strategy 2 wins: e12 /∈
(0,1) and starting from any initial condition u1(0) ∈ (0,1), u1→ e2.
• when both strategies are altruistic, coexistence occurs: e12 ∈ (0,1) is glob-
ally stable, that is, starting from any initial condition u1(0) ∈ (0,1), u1→
e12.
• when both strategies are selfish, the system is bistable: e12 ∈ (0,1) is un-
stable, and u1 converges to either e1 or e2 depending on whether it is
initially larger or smaller than e12.
In terms of evolutionary stable strategy, this indicates that, for well-mixed
populations, a strategy is evolutionary stable if it is selfish, but not if it is
altruistic.
Spatial analog. To define a spatial analog of the replicator equation,
we employ the framework of interacting particle systems by positioning
the players on an infinite grid. Our spatial game is then described by a
continuous-time Markov chain ηt whose state space maps the d-dimensional
lattice into the set of strategies {1,2}, with ηt(x) denoting the strategy at
vertex x. Players being located on a geometrical structure, space can be in-
cluded in the form of local interactions by assuming that the payoff of each
player is computed based on the strategy of her neighbors. More precisely,
we define the interaction neighborhood of vertex x as
Nx :=
{
y ∈ Zd :y 6= x and max
i=1,2,...,d
|yi − xi| ≤M
}
for x ∈ Zd,
where M is referred to as the dispersal range. Letting fj(x, η) denote the
fraction of type j players in the neighborhood of vertex x, the payoff of x is
then defined as
φ(x, η|η(x) = i) := ai1f1(x, η) + ai2f2(x, η) for i= 1,2,
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON THE LATTICE 5
which can be viewed as the spatial analog of (1). The dynamics is again
derived by interpreting the payoff as a fitness. More precisely, we think of
a payoff as either a birth rate or a death rate depending on its sign: if the
player at vertex x has a positive payoff, then at rate this payoff, one of her
neighbors chosen uniformly at random adopts the strategy at x, while if she
has a negative payoff, then at rate minus this payoff, she adopts the strategy
of one of her neighbors again chosen uniformly at random. This is described
formally by the Markov generator
Lf(η)
=N−1
∑
x
∑
y∈Nx
φ(y, η)1{φ(y, η)> 0}1{η(x) 6= η(y)}[f(ηx)− f(η)](3)
−N−1
∑
x
∑
y∈Nx
φ(x, η)1{φ(x, η)< 0}1{η(x) 6= η(y)}[f(ηx)− f(η)],
where configuration ηx is obtained from configuration η by changing the
strategy at vertex x and leaving the strategy at the other vertices unchanged,
and where the constant N is simply the common size of the interaction neigh-
borhoods. Note that L indeed defines a unique Markov process according
to, for example, Theorem B3 in Liggett [21]. Model (3) is inspired from
the spatial version of Maynard Smith’s evolutionary games introduced by
Brown and Hansell [3]. Their model allows for any number of players per
vertex, and the dynamics includes three components: migration, death due
to crowding and birth or death based on the value of the payoff. Our model
only retains the third component. We also point out that the model ob-
tained from (3) by assuming that the population is well mixing, called the
mean-field approximation, is precisely the replicator equation (2). Therefore
the consequences of the inclusion of space and stochasticity can indeed be
understood through the comparison of both models, which as we show later,
disagree in many ways. In fact, the original model of Brown and Hansell is
also studied numerically in [11] where it is used to argue that the inclusion
of space and/or stochasticity can lead to drastic behavior changes.
Main results. We now study the limiting behavior of the spatial game.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all the results below apply to the pro-
cess starting from Bernoulli product measures in which the density of each
strategy is positive and constant across space:
P (η0(x1) = η0(x2) = · · ·= η0(xn) = 1) = ρn for some ρ ∈ (0,1)(4)
and every finite sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn of distinct vertices. From the point of
view of the replicator equation, whether a strategy wins, or both strategies
coexist or the system is bistable is defined based on the value of the nontrivial
fixed point e12 and the stability of this and the other two fixed points. For
the spatial game, we say that:
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• strategy i ∈ {1,2} survives whenever
P (ηs(x) = i for some s > t) = 1 for all (x, t) ∈ Zd ×R+;
• strategy i ∈ {1,2} goes extinct whenever
lim
t→∞
P (ηt(x) = i) = 0 for all x∈ Zd;
• a strategy wins if it survives whereas the other strategy goes extinct;
• both strategies coexist whenever
lim inf
t→∞
P (ηt(x) 6= ηt(y))> 0 for all x, y ∈ Zd;
• the system clusters whenever
lim
t→∞
P (ηt(x) 6= ηt(y)) = 0 for all x, y ∈ Zd.
Numerical simulations suggest that in the presence of one selfish and one
altruistic strategy, the selfish strategy wins, just as in the replicator equa-
tion. In contrast, when both strategies are selfish, spatial and nonspatial
models disagree. Our brief analysis of the replicator equation indicates that
the system is bistable: both strategies are ESS. The transition curve for the
spatial model is difficult to find based on simulations, but simple heuris-
tic arguments looking at the interface between two adjacent blocks of the
two strategies suggest that the most selfish strategy, that is, the one with
the largest ai, always wins even when starting at a very low density, thus
indicating that only the most selfish strategy is an ESS. The fact that bista-
bility in the mean-field model results in the presence of a strong type in
the interacting particle system has already been observed for a number of
models, and we refer to [10, 11] for such examples. For two altruistic strate-
gies, coexistence is again possible, but the coexistence region of the spatial
game is significantly smaller than that of the replicator equation: except in
the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case, coexistence occurs in a thorn-
shaped region starting at the bifurcation point a1 = a2 = 0. The smaller the
range of the interactions and the spatial dimension, the smaller the coexis-
tence region. In the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case, the simulations
are particularly difficult to interpret when
a11 + a12 < 0< a12 and a22 + a21 < 0< a21.(5)
See Figure 4 for a picture of two realizations when (5) holds. However,
we were able to prove that the one-dimensional nearest neighbor system
clusters except in a parameter region with measure zero in the space of the
2× 2 matrices in which all the players have a zero payoff eventually, thus
leading to a fixation of the system in a configuration in which both strategies
are present. More generally, we conjecture that, except in this parameter
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON THE LATTICE 7
region with measure zero, the least altruistic strategy always wins, just as
in the presence of selfish-selfish interactions. The thick continuous lines on
the right-hand side of Figures 1 and 2 summarize our conjectures for the
spatial game in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case and all the other
cases, respectively. These results are reminiscent of the ones obtained for the
models introduced in [17, 18, 24], which though they are not examples of
evolutionary games, also include density-dependent birth or death rates. Our
proofs and the proofs in these three references strongly differ while showing
the same pattern: for all four models, the inclusion of local interactions
induces a reduction of the coexistence region of the mean-field model, and
there is a dominant type that wins even when starting at arbitrarily low
density in the region where the mean-field model displays bistability.
We now state our analytical results for the spatial stochastic process,
which confirms in particular these two important aspects. To motivate and
explain our first result, we observe that the presence of density-dependent
birth and death rates typically precludes the existence of a mathematically
tractable dual process. See Liggett [20], Section II.3, for a general definition
of duality and dual process. Note, however, that if a11 = a12 and a22 = a21,
then the payoff of players of either type is constant across all possible spatial
configurations: birth and death rates are no longer density dependent. For
this specific choice of the payoffs, the process reduces to a biased voter
model [1, 2], and therefore strategy 1 wins if in addition a12 > a21. For all
other payoff matrices, the dynamics is more complicated, but there is a
large parameter region in which the spatial game can still be coupled with a
biased voter model to deduce that strategy 1 wins. This parameter region is
specified in the following theorem. See also the right-hand side of Figure 2
where the boundary of this region is represented in dashed lines on the
a11 − a22 plane.
Theorem 1. Assume that a12 > a21. Then strategy 1 wins whenever
max(a22, a21) + a21(N − 1)−1 <min(a11, a12) + a12(N − 1)−1.
This parameter region intersects the regions in which the replicator equa-
tion displays coexistence and bistability. In particular, the theorem confirms
that the inclusion of local interactions induces a reduction of the coexis-
tence and bistable regions in accordance with the simulation results men-
tioned above. The next two results strengthen this theorem by proving that
the parameter region in which there is a unique ESS extends to arbitrarily
small/large values of a11 and a22. To state these results, it is convenient to
introduce the vector a¯11 := (a12, a21, a22).
Theorem 2. For all a¯11 there exists m(a¯11)<∞ such that
strategy 1 wins whenever a11 >m(a¯11).
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This implies that, in accordance with our numerical simulations, the pa-
rameter region in which the replicator equation is bistable while there is
a unique ESS for the spatial game is much larger than the parameter re-
gion covered by Theorem 1. Note also that, in view of the symmetry of the
model, the previous theorem also holds by exchanging the roles of the two
strategies.
Theorem 3. For all a¯11 such that a12 < 0, there exists m(a¯11)<∞ such
that
strategy 2 wins whenever a11 <−m(a¯11).
This implies that, again in accordance with our numerical simulations,
the parameter region in which coexistence occurs for the replicator equation
while there is a unique ESS for the spatial game is much larger than the
one covered by Theorem 1. Once more, we point out that, in view of the
symmetry of the model, the theorem also holds by exchanging the roles of
the two strategies as indicated in Figure 2. The previous two results hold
regardless of the spatial dimension and the range of the interactions and
can be significantly improved in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case
through an analysis of the boundaries of the system. More precisely, letting
M∗2 := {A= (aij) such that
(6)
a11a12a21a22(a11 + a12)(a22 + a21) 6= 0 and a11 + a12 6= a22 + a21}
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Assume that M = d= 1. Then:
• strategy 1 wins for all a11 >max(a22, a21) + (a21 − a12), and
• the system starting from any translation invariant distribution clusters for
all A ∈M∗2.
Figure 1 gives the phase diagram of the one-dimensional nearest neigh-
bor process obtained by combining Theorems 3 and 4. The parameter re-
gion in the first part of Theorem 4, and the one obtained by symmetry are
represented in dashed lines when a12 > a21. For most of the parameter re-
gion in which at least one strategy is selfish, the most selfish strategy wins,
which significantly improves Theorem 2. The second part of the theorem
supplements Theorem 3 by proving that, except in the measure zero pa-
rameter region that corresponds to A ∈M∗2, coexistence is not possible in
the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case. Finally, our last theorem looks
more closely at the interactions between two altruistic strategies and con-
firms that, except in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case, coexistence
is possible for the spatial game.
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Fig. 1. List of the most popular 2×2 games on the left and phase diagrams of the spatial
game along with a summary of the theorems in the a11− a22 plane on the right. The thick
lines refer to the transition curves suggested by the simulations. BV= biased voter model,
and RE= replicator equation.
Theorem 5. There is m :=m(a12, a21)> 0 such that coexistence occurs
when
c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−m and c(M,d)a11 < a22 <−m,
where, for each range M and spatial dimension d,
c(M,d) :=
2M((2M +1)d − 2)
(M +1)(2M(2M +1)d−1 − 1) .
Note that the parameter region in the theorem is nonempty if and only if
c(M,d) is strictly larger than one. In addition, the larger c(M,d), the larger
this parameter region. This, together with Table 1, indicates that, except
in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case in which the region given in
the theorem is empty, the coexistence region contains an infinite subset of
a certain triangle whose range increases with both the dispersal range and
the spatial dimension. We refer to Figure 2 for a summary of the theorems
that exclude the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case.
The role of space in the most popular games. The last step before going
into the details of the proofs is to discuss the implications of our results in
the most popular symmetric two-person games. To define these games, note
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Table 1
c(M,d) for different values of the range M and the dimension d
d= 1 d= 2 d= 3 d= 4 d= 5 d= 6 d= 7 d= 8 d= 9
M = 1 1.0000 1.4000 1.4706 1.4906 1.4969 1.4990 1.4997 1.4999 1.5000
M = 2 1.3333 1.6140 1.6566 1.6647 1.6663 1.6666 1.6667 1.6667 1.6667
M = 3 1.5000 1.7195 1.7457 1.7494 1.7499 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500
M = 4 1.6000 1.7803 1.7978 1.7998 1.8000 1.8000 1.8000 1.8000 1.8000
M = 5 1.6667 1.8196 1.8321 1.8332 1.8333 1.8333 1.8333 1.8333 1.8333
M = 6 1.7143 1.8470 1.8564 1.8571 1.8571 1.8571 1.8571 1.8571 1.8571
M = 7 1.7500 1.8672 1.8745 1.8750 1.8750 1.8750 1.8750 1.8750 1.8750
M = 8 1.7778 1.8827 1.8885 1.8889 1.8889 1.8889 1.8889 1.8889 1.8889
M = 9 1.8000 1.8950 1.8997 1.9000 1.9000 1.9000 1.9000 1.9000 1.9000
that there are 4! = 24 possible orderings of the four payoffs therefore, also
accounting for symmetry, twelve possible strategic situations corresponding
to twelve symmetric two-person games involving two strategies. These twelve
regions of the parameter space are represented in the a11− a22 plane on the
left-hand diagrams of Figures 1–2 along with the names of the most popular
games under the assumption a12 > a21.
Fig. 2. List of the most popular 2×2 games on the left and phase diagrams of the spatial
game along with a summary of the theorems in the a11− a22 plane on the right. The thick
lines refer to the transition curves suggested by the simulations. BV= biased voter model,
and RE= replicator equation.
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Prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is probably the most popu-
lar symmetric two-person game. When a12 > a21, strategy 1 means defection
whereas strategy 2 means cooperation. From the point of view of the repli-
cator equation, defection is the only ESS. Numerical simulations suggest
that the same holds for our spatial model, which is covered in part in the
general case and completely in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case in
Theorems 1 and 4.
Stag hunt. In the stag hunt game with a12 > a21, strategy 1 represents
safety: hunting a hare, whereas strategy 2 represents social cooperation:
hunting a stag. In the absence of space, both strategies are evolutionary sta-
ble. In contrast, Theorem 2 shows that, in the presence of local interactions,
social cooperation is the only ESS if the reward a22 for social cooperation
is high enough, that is, a stag is worth much more than a hare, whereas if
the reward is not significant, then safety becomes the only ESS according
to Theorems 1 and 4.
Hawk-dove. In the hawk-dove game, strategy 1 represents hawks that fight
for the resource and strategy 2, doves that share peacefully the resource. The
cost of a fight is larger than the value of the contested resource, which makes
this game an example of anti-coordination game: the best possible response
to a strategy is to play the other strategy. In the absence of space, none
of the strategies is evolutionary stable so coexistence occurs. In contrast,
Theorem 3 indicates that, in the presence of a spatial structure, the dove
strategy is the only ESS when the cost of an escalated fight is high enough
or equivalently when a11 is small enough.
Battle of the sexes. In the battle of the sexes, husband and wife cannot
remember if they planned to meet at the opera or at the football match. The
husband would prefer the match and the wife the opera, but overall both
would prefer to go to the same place. Mutual cooperation, that is, both go
to the place that the other prefers, leads to the lowest possible payoff a22
which makes this game another example of anti-coordination game. In the
absence of space, none of the strategies is evolutionary stable, so coexistence
occurs. Coexistence is also possible in the presence of a spatial structure
according to Theorem 5. However, if the cost of mutual cooperation is too
high, that is, a22 too small, then defection becomes the unique ESS according
to Theorem 3.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proofs of the theorems. We point
out that the theorems are not proved in the order they are stated but instead
grouped based on the approach and techniques they rely on, which makes
the reading of the proofs somewhat easier.
2. Proof of Theorem 4. We first study the one-dimensional nearest neigh-
bor system. The analysis in this case relies on the study of the process that
keeps track of the boundaries between the two strategies and strongly differs
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from the analysis of the system in higher spatial dimensions or with a larger
range of interactions. Throughout this section, we let ξt denote the boundary
process
ξt(x) := ηt(x+ 1/2)− ηt(x− 1/2) for all x ∈D := Z+1/2
and think of sites in state 0 as empty, sites in state +1 as occupied by
a + particle and sites in state −1 as occupied by a − particle. To begin
with, we assume that
η0 :Z−→ {1,2} is such that η0(x) = 1 for all x≤M,(7)
where M is a positive integer. Note that, from the point of view of the
boundary process, this implies that we start with no particle to the left of
M . Also, we let
Xt := inf{x ∈D : ξt(x) 6= 0}= inf{x ∈D : ξt(x) = 1}
denote the position of the leftmost particle, which is necessarily a + particle
in view of the initial configuration. The key to proving the first part of
Theorem 4 is given by the next lemma, which shows the result when starting
from the particular initial configuration (7).
Lemma 6. Assume (7) and a11 >max(a22, a21) + (a21 − a12). Then
P
(
Xt > 0 for all t > 0 and lim
t→∞
Xt =∞
)
≥ 1− exp(−a0M)
for some a0 > 0.
Proof. The idea is to prove that there exists a > 0 such that
lim
h→0
h−1E(Zt+h −Zt|Zt)≤ 0 almost surely where Zt := exp(−aXt)
and then apply the optimal stopping theorem to the supermartingale (Zt).
Since the transition rates of the process (Xt) depends on the distance be-
tween the + particle it keeps track of and the next particle to the right, we
introduce the gap process
Kt := inf{x ∈D :x>Xt and ξt(x) 6= 0} −Xt
= inf{x ∈D :x>Xt and ξt(x) =−1} −Xt.
Looking at the payoff of the players at sites Xt ± 1/2 and their associated
birth and death rates, which are reported in Figure 3 depending on the value
of the gap, we find
Φ1(a) := lim
h→0
h−1E(Zt+h −Zt|Zt,Kt = 1)
≤ (e−a(Xt+2) − e−aXt) lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt ≥ 2|Kt = 1)
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Fig. 3. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 6. The numbers are the top of both pictures
are the payoffs of the two players at Xt±1/2 and the numbers at the bottom the associated
birth and death rates. Birth events are symbolically represented by double arrows and death
events by crosses.
+ (e−a(Xt−1) − e−aXt) lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt =−1|Kt = 1)
(8)
= Zt(e
−2a − 1)((1/4)max(0, a11 + a12) +max(0,−a21))
+Zt(e
a − 1)((1/4)max(0,−a11 − a12) + (1/2)max(0, a21))
=: Ψ1(a)
almost surely, where the inequality is obtained by ignoring births from Xt+
3/2 and jumps of more than two units to the right. Note also that the
derivative of the right-hand side evaluated at a = 0 satisfies the following
inequality almost surely:
Ψ′1(0) =−(1/2)max(0, a11 + a12)Zt − 2max(0,−a21)Zt
+ (1/4)max(0,−a11 − a12)Zt + (1/2)max(0, a21)Zt
≤ (1/4)max(0,−a11 − a12)Zt − (1/4)max(0, a11 + a12)Zt(9)
+ (1/2)max(0, a21)Zt − (1/2)max(0,−a21)Zt
= (1/4)(−a11 − a12 +2a21)Zt
≤ (1/4)(max(a22, a21) + (a21 − a12)− a11)Zt < 0.
Similarly, conditioning on the event Kt ≥ 2, we have
Φ2(a) := lim
h→0
h−1E(Zt+h −Zt|Zt,Kt ≥ 2)
= (e−a(Xt+1) − e−aXt) lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt = 1|Kt ≥ 2)
+ (e−a(Xt−1) − e−aXt) lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt =−1|Kt ≥ 2)(10)
= Zt(e
−a − 1)(1/4)(max(0, a11 + a12) +max(0,−a22 − a21))
+Zt(e
a − 1)(1/4)(max(0,−a11 − a12) +max(0, a22 + a21))
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almost surely. Taking again the derivative at a= 0, we get
Φ′2(0) =−(1/4)max(0, a11 + a12)Zt − (1/4)max(0,−a22 − a21)Zt
+ (1/4)max(0,−a11 − a12)Zt + (1/4)max(0, a22 + a21)Zt
(11)
= (1/4)(−a11 − a12 + a22 + a21)Zt
≤ (1/4)(max(a22, a21) + (a21 − a12)− a11)Zt < 0
almost surely. From (8)–(11), we deduce that
Φ1(a0)≤Ψ1(a0)≤Ψ1(0) = 0 and Φ2(a0)≤Φ2(0) = 0
for some a0 > 0 fixed from now on. In particular,
lim
h→0
h−1E(exp(−a0Xt+h)− exp(−a0Xt)|Xt)≤ 0 almost surely,
which shows that Zt = exp(−a0Xt) is a supermartingale. As mentioned
above, we conclude using the optimal stopping theorem: we introduce the
stopping times
τ− := inf{t :Xt =−1/2} and τn := inf{t :Xt ≥ n+1/2} for all n>M.
Using that Tn := min(τ−, τn) is almost surely finite, we get
EZTn ≤EZ0 =Ee−a0X0 ≤ e−a0M ,
EZTn =E(ZTn |Tn = τ−)P (Tn = τ−) +E(ZTn |Tn = τn)P (Tn = τn)
≥ ea0/2(1−P (Tn = τn)) + e−a0nP (Tn = τn).
Observing that the sequence {Tn = τn} is nonincreasing for the inclusion,
applying the monotone convergence theorem and using the previous inequal-
ities, we deduce that
P
(
Xt > 0 for all t > 0 and lim
t→∞
Xt =∞
)
≥ P (Tn = τn for all n>M) = lim
n→∞P (Tn = τn)
≥ lim
n→∞(e
a0/2 − e−a0M )(ea0/2 − e−a0n)−1 ≥ 1− e−a0M .
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
It follows from the previous lemma that, starting more generally from a
product measure with a positive density of type 1 players, strategy 1 wins
with probability one. This statement, which corresponds to the first part of
Theorem 4, is proved in the next lemma.
Lemma 7. Assume (4) and a11 >max(a22, a21)+(a21−a12). Then strat-
egy 1 wins.
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Proof. Let M be a positive integer, and let
xM := inf{x ∈ Z :x> 0 and η0(x) = η0(x+1) = · · ·= η0(x+2M + 2) = 1}.
Note that, starting from (4), vertex xM is well defined and almost surely fi-
nite. We define the cluster starting at xM as the set of space–time points that
can be reached from xM by a path moving forward in time and contained
in the space–time region occupied by type 1 players
C(xM) := {(x, t) ∈ Z×R+ : (xM ,0)→ (x, t)},
where (xM ,0)→ (x, t) means that there exist
z0 = xM , z1, . . . , zn := x ∈ Z and s0 := 0< s1 < · · ·< sn < sn+1 := t ∈R+
such that the following two conditions hold:
• for i= 1,2, . . . , n, we have |zi − zi−1|= 1, and
• for i= 0,1, . . . , n, we have ηs(xi) = 1 for all si ≤ s≤ si+1.
Finally, for all times t, we let
lt := inf{x ∈ Z : (x, t)∈C(xM )} and rt := sup{x∈ Z : (x, t)∈C(xM )}
be, respectively, the leftmost and the rightmost vertices in the cluster. Due
to one-dimensional nearest neighbor interactions, as long as the cluster is
nonempty, all vertices between the leftmost and rightmost vertices follow
strategy 1. In particular, it follows from Lemma 6 and the obvious symmetry
of the evolution rules that the probability that strategy 1 wins is larger than
P ((x, t) ∈C(xM ) for all x ∈ Z and all t large)
= P
(
lt < rt for all t > 0 and lim
t→∞
lt =−∞ and lim
t→∞
rt =+∞
)
≥ P
(
lt < xM +M +1< rt for all t > 0 and
lim
t→∞
lt =−∞ and lim
t→∞
rt =+∞
)
≥ P
(
(−Xt)> 0 for all t > 0 and lim
t→∞
(−Xt) =−∞
)
× P
(
Xt > 0 for all t > 0 and lim
t→∞
Xt =+∞
)
≥ (1− exp(−a0M))2.
Since a0 > 0, and this holds for all M , it follows that strategy 1 wins almost
surely. This completes the proof of the lemma and the first part of the
theorem. 
The next two lemmas focus on the second part of the theorem whose
proof consists in showing extinction of the boundary process starting from
any translation invariant distribution.
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Lemma 8. Let A ∈M∗2 as in (6). Then the system clusters if
a22 + a21 < a11 + a12 and (a11 + a12 > 0 or a21 < 0).(12)
Proof. As pointed out before the statement of the lemma, to prove
clustering, it suffices to prove extinction of the boundary process since, for
all x < y, we have
P (ηt(x) 6= ηt(y))≤ P (ηt(z) 6= ηt(z + 1) for some z = x, . . . , y − 1)
≤
y−1∑
z=x
P (ηt(z) 6= ηt(z + 1)) =
y−1∑
z=x
P (ξt(z +1/2) 6= 0),
which converges to zero whenever the boundary process goes extinct. In
particular, the main objective is to show that the density of particles u(t)
in the boundary process at time t converges to zero as time goes to infinity,
that is,
u(t) := P (ξt(x) 6= 0)→ 0 as t→∞.(13)
Due to translation invariance of the initial distribution and the evolution
rules, the probability above is indeed constant across space. The definition
of the boundary process also implies that two consecutive particles must
have opposite signs. Moreover, due to one-dimensional nearest neighbor in-
teractions, particles cannot be created and if a particle jumps onto another
particle then both particles, necessarily with opposite signs, annihilate. In
particular,
u(t)≤ u(s) for all s≤ t therefore lim
t→∞
u(t) := l exists.
To show that the limit l= 0, we prove that, in every group of four consecutive
particles at arbitrary times, at least one particle is killed after an almost
surely finite time. Let s≥ 0 and
X+s := inf{x ∈D :x> 0 and ξs(x) =+1},
X−s := inf{x ∈D :x>X+s and ξs(x) =−1}
be the position at time s of the first + particle to the right of the origin
and the position at time s of the following particle, which is necessarily
a − particle. Also, we let
X+t := position at time t > s of the + particle that originates
from X+s at time s,
X−t := position at time t > s of the − particle that originates
from X−s at time s
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which are well defined until one particle is killed when we set X±t =∅, and
τ+ := inf{t > s :X+t =∅} and τ− := inf{t > s :X−t =∅}.
We claim that inf(τ+, τ−)<∞. To prove our claim, we let
σ+ := time at which the + particle at X
+
t annihilates with a − particle
on its left,
σ− := time at which the − particle at X−t annihilates
with a + particle on its right.
By inclusion of events, we have
P (inf(τ+, τ−)<∞| inf(σ+, σ−)<∞) = 1.(14)
Moreover, in view of the first inequality in (12), we have the following tran-
sition rate:
lim
h→0
h−1P (X+t+h −X+t = 1|X+t 6=∅ and ξt(X+t − 1) = ξt(X+t +1) = 0)
= (1/4)(max(0, a11 + a12) +max(0,−a22 − a21))
> (1/4)(max(0, a11 + a12)− (a11 + a12)
+max(0,−a22 − a21) + (a22 + a21))
= (1/4)(max(0,−a11 − a12) +max(0, a22 + a21))
= lim
h→0
h−1P (X+t+h −X+t =−1|X+t 6=∅ and
ξt(X
+
t − 1) = ξt(X+t + 1) = 0).
Since on the event σ+ =∞ the particle at X+t cannot jump onto a − particle
on its left, we deduce that, on this event, the position of the particle has a
positive drift until it is one unit from the − particle on its right. Similarly,
on the event σ− =∞, the position of the particle at X−t has a negative drift
until it is one unit from the + particle on its left. This implies that
P (X−t −X+t = 1 and ξt(X−t +1)ξt(X+t − 1) = 0
(15)
for some t ∈ (s,∞)| inf(σ+, σ−) =∞) = 1.
Also, each time X−t −X+t = 1, both particles annihilate at rate at least
(1/2)max(0,−a21) + (1/4)max(0, a11 + a12).
The second inequality in (12) implies that this rate is strictly positive which,
together with (15) and the fact that the process is Markov further implies
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that the two particles at X±t annihilate after an almost surely finite time.
In particular,
P (inf(τ+, τ−)<∞| inf(σ+, σ−) =∞) = 1.(16)
Combining (14) and (16), we deduce that, in every group of four consecutive
particles at arbitrary times, at least one particle is killed after a finite time,
therefore there exists a strictly increasing sequence of almost surely finite
times s0 = 0< s1 < · · ·< sn < · · · such that
u(sn)≤ (1/2)u(sn−1)≤ (1/4)u(sn−2)≤ · · · ≤ (1/2)nu(s0)≤ (1/2)n.
This shows (13) and completes the proof of the lemma. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, the last step is to prove the ana-
log of Lemma 8 when the second set of inequalities in (12) does not hold.
This includes in particular all the payoff matrices that satisfy (5). This case
is rather delicate since a player of either type cannot change her strategy
whenever her two nearest neighbors and next two nearest neighbors all four
follow the same strategy. In particular, two particles next to each other an-
nihilate at a positive rate only if there is a third particle nearby so the idea
of the proof is to show that we can indeed bring sets of three consecutive
particles together. Figure 4 gives an illustration of this problem: boundaries
by pair repulse each other and at least three particles are necessary to induce
annihilation.
(a) A= ((−8,3), (4,−8)) (b) A= ((−8,4), (4,−8))
Fig. 4. Realizations of the one-dimensional nearest neighbor spatial game on the torus
Z/600Z for two different payoff matrices that satisfy the inequalities in (5). Time goes
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Lemma 9. Let A ∈M∗2 as in (6). Then the system clusters if
a22 + a21 < a11 + a12 < 0 and a21 > 0.(17)
Proof. Following the same approach as in the previous lemma, it suf-
fices to prove that, starting with a positive density of boundaries, annihi-
lating events occur in a finite time within a given finite set of consecutive
boundaries. The main difficulty is that condition (17) now implies that start-
ing with a single type 2 player, the two resulting boundaries cannot annihi-
late therefore to prove the occurrence of annihilating events, we need to look
at a set of four boundaries instead of two like in the proof of the previous
lemma. To begin with, we start from a configuration with infinitely many
type 1 players and exactly four boundaries, which forces the initial number
of type 2 players to be finite, and denote the position of the boundaries by
X+t <X
−
t <Y
+
t < Y
−
t
before an annihilating event has occurred. The same argument as in the
proof of the previous lemma based on the first inequality in (17) implies
that
lim
h→0
h−1E((X−t+h −X+t+h)− (X−t −X+t )|
(18)
X−t −X+t > 1 and Y +t −X−t > 1)< 0.
The same applies to the two rightmost boundaries,
lim
h→0
h−1E((Y −t+h − Y +t+h)− (Y −t − Y +t )|
(19)
Y −t − Y +t > 1 and Y +t −X−t > 1)< 0.
Moreover, by symmetry, we have
lim
h→0
h−1P ((X−t+h +X
+
t+h)− (X−t +X+t ) = 1|Y +t −X−t > 1)
(20)
= lim
h→0
h−1P ((X−t+h +X
+
t+h)− (X−t +X+t ) =−1|Y +t −X−t > 1).
In words, the midpoint between the two leftmost boundaries evolve accord-
ing to a symmetric random walk. The same holds for the midpoint between
the two rightmost boundaries. To deduce the occurrence of an annihilating
event, we distinguish two cases:
• Case 1. Assume (17) and a12 < 0. In this case, (20) and the recurrence of
one-dimensional symmetric simple random walks imply that
P (Y +t −X−t = 1 for some t > 0) = 1.
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Since the event above induces a configuration in which a type 1 player
has two type 2 neighbors, and so a negative payoff a12 < 0, each time this
event occurs, the two intermediate boundaries annihilate at a positive
rate. This, together with a basic restart argument, implies the occurrence
of an annihilating event after an almost surely finite time.
• Case 2. Assume (17) and a12 > 0. In this case, (18)–(20) imply that, with
probability one, we can bring three consecutive boundaries together: more
precisely,
P (Y +t −X−t = 1 and (X−t −X+t = 1 or Y −t −Y +t = 1) for some t > 0) = 1.
Since the event above induces a configuration in which a type 2 player
has two type 1 neighbors, and so a positive payoff a21 > 0, each time
this event occurs, either the two leftmost boundaries or the two rightmost
boundaries annihilate at a positive rate. We again deduce the occurrence
of an annihilating event after an almost surely finite time.
The two results above still hold when starting from a translation invariant
distribution with a positive density of boundaries unless the leftmost of the
four boundaries or the rightmost of the four boundaries annihilate before
with another boundary. In any case, each set of four consecutive boundaries
is reduced by one after an almost surely finite time. This, together with the
exact same arguments as in the proof of the previous lemma, establishes the
desired result. 
Lemmas 8–9 imply clustering for all A ∈M∗2 with a11 + a12 > a22 + a21.
The second part of the theorem directly follows by also using some obvious
symmetry.
3. Proof of Theorem 1. This section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 1, which relies on a standard coupling argument between the spatial
game and a biased voter model that favors individuals of type 1. Recall that
the biased voter model [1, 2] is the spin system with flip rate
cBV(x, ξ) = µ1f1(x, ξ)1{ξ(x) = 2}+ µ2f2(x, ξ)1{ξ(x) = 1}
for which individuals of type 1 win whenever µ1 > µ2. Recall also that the
spatial game reduces to such a spin system if and only if the payoff received
by players of either type is constant regardless of the spatial configuration.
In particular, strategy 1 wins whenever
a11 = a12 > a21 = a22.
For all other parameters, the dynamics is more complicated but the process
can be coupled with a biased voter model that favors type 1 individuals
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in a certain parameter region. To make this argument rigorous and prove
Theorem 1, we introduce the payoff functions
φ1(z) := a12(z/N) + a11(1− z/N) = (a12 − a11)(z/N) + a11,
φ2(z) := a22(z/N) + a21(1− z/N) = (a22 − a21)(z/N) + a21.
The coupling argument is given in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Assume that a12 > a21. Then, strategy 1 wins whenever
max(φ2(z) : z ∈ {0,1, . . . ,N − 1})<min(φ1(z) : z ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}).(21)
Proof. Denoting by cSG(x, η) the flip rate of the spatial game, we have
cSG(x, η) = cBV(x, ξ) = 0 when fη(x)(x, η) = fξ(x)(x, ξ) = 1.(22)
Now, observe that the player at x may flip 2→ 1 because she has a negative
payoff and so a positive death rate or because she has a neighbor following
strategy 1 that has a positive payoff and so a positive birth rate. In particu-
lar, given that the player at vertex x follows strategy 2 and has at least one
neighbor following strategy 1, the rate at which the strategy at x flips is
max(0,−φ(x, η))f1(x, η) +N−1
∑
y∼x
max(0, φ(y, η))1{η(y) = 1}
(23)
≥min
z 6=N
max(0,−φ2(z))f1(x, η) +min
z 6=0
max(0, φ1(z))f1(x, η).
Similarly, given that the player at vertex x follows strategy 1 and has at
least one neighbor following strategy 2, the rate at which the strategy at x
flips is
max(0,−φ(x, η))f2(x, η) +N−1
∑
y∼x
max(0, φ(y, η))1{η(y) = 2}
(24)
≤max
z 6=0
max(0,−φ1(z))f2(x, η) +max
z 6=N
max(0, φ2(z))f2(x, η).
Combining (22)–(24), we obtain that strategy 1 wins whenever
µ2 := max
z 6=0
max(0,−φ1(z)) +max
z 6=N
max(0, φ2(z))
(25)
< min
z 6=N
max(0,−φ2(z)) +min
z 6=0
max(0, φ1(z)) = :µ1
since, under this assumption, if η(x)≤ ξ(x) for all x ∈ Zd, then
cSG(x, η)≤ µ2f2(x, ξ) = cBV(x, ξ) when η(x) = ξ(x) = 1,
cSG(x, η)≥ µ1f1(x, ξ) = cBV(x, ξ) when η(x) = ξ(x) = 2,
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which, according to Theorem III.1.5 in [20], implies that the set of type 1
players dominates stochastically its counterpart in a biased voter model that
favors type 1. To complete the proof, it remains to show that (21) implies
(25). Note that (25) is equivalent to
max
z 6=N
max(0, φ2(z))−min
z 6=N
max(0,−φ2(z))
(26)
<min
z 6=0
max(0, φ1(z))−max
z 6=0
max(0,−φ1(z)).
Note also that the left-hand side of (26) reduces to
max
z 6=N
max(0, φ2(z))−min
z 6=N
max(0,−φ2(z))
= max
(
0,max
z 6=N
φ2(z)
)
−max
(
0,min
z 6=N
(−φ2(z))
)
(27)
=max
(
0,max
z 6=N
φ2(z)
)
−max
(
0,−max
z 6=N
φ2(z)
)
=max
(
0,max
z 6=N
φ2(z)
)
+min
(
0,max
z 6=N
φ2(z)
)
=max
z 6=N
φ2(z).
Similarly, for the payoff of type 1 players, we have
min
z 6=0
max(0, φ1(z))−max
z 6=0
max(0,−φ1(z)) = min
z 6=0
φ1(z).(28)
Since (21), (27) and (28) imply (26) and then (25), the proof is complete.

In the following lemma, we complete the proof of Theorem 1 based on
(21).
Lemma 11. Assume that a12 > a21. Then, strategy 1 wins whenever
max(a22, a21) + a21(N − 1)−1 <min(a11, a12) + a12(N − 1)−1.(29)
Proof. This directly follows from Lemma 10 by showing that the pa-
rameter region in which the inequality in (21) holds is exactly (29). To
re-write (21) explicitly in terms of the payoffs, we distinguish four cases
depending on the monotonicity of the functions φ1 and φ2.
• Case 1. When max(a22, a21) = a21 and min(a11, a12) = a12, both pay-
off functions are decreasing; therefore, according to the previous lemma,
strategy 1 wins whenever
max
z 6=N
φ2(z) = φ2(0) = a21 < a12 = φ1(N) = min
z 6=0
φ1(z),
which is always true under our general assumption a12 > a21.
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• Case 2. When max(a22, a21) = a21 and min(a11, a12) = a11, according to
the previous lemma, strategy 1 wins whenever
max
z 6=N
φ2(z) = φ2(0) = a21 = (1− 1/N)max(a22, a21) + (1/N)a21
< (1− 1/N)min(a11, a12) + (1/N)a12
= (1− 1/N)a11 + (1/N)a12 = φ1(1) =min
z 6=0
φ1(z),
which is true whenever (29) holds.
• Case 3. When max(a22, a21) = a22 and min(a11, a12) = a12, according to
the previous lemma, strategy 1 wins whenever
max
z 6=N
φ2(z) = φ2(N − 1) = (1− 1/N)a22 + (1/N)a21
= (1− 1/N)max(a22, a21) + (1/N)a21
< (1− 1/N)min(a11, a12) + (1/N)a12 = a12 = φ1(N) = min
z 6=0
φ1(z),
which is true whenever (29) holds.
• Case 4. When max(a22, a21) = a22 and min(a11, a12) = a11, according to
the previous lemma, strategy 1 wins whenever
max
z 6=N
φ2(z) = φ2(N − 1) = (1− 1/N)a22 + (1/N)a21
= (1− 1/N)max(a22, a21) + (1/N)a21
< (1− 1/N)min(a11, a12) + (1/N)a12
= (1− 1/N)a11 + (1/N)a12 = φ1(1) =min
z 6=0
φ1(z),
which is true whenever (29) holds.
This completes the proof of the lemma and the proof of Theorem 1. 
4. Proof of Theorem 5. The common background behind the proofs of
the remaining three theorems is the use of a block construction, though the
arguments required to indeed be able to apply this technique strongly differ
among these theorems. The idea of the block construction is to couple a
certain collection of good events related to the process properly rescaled in
space and time with the set of open sites of oriented site percolation on the
directed graph H1 with vertex set
H := {(z,n) ∈ Zd ×Z+ : z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zd + n is even}
and in which there is an oriented edge
(z,n)→ (z′, n′)
if and only if z′ = z ± ei for some i= 1,2, . . . , d and n′ = n+1,
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where ei is the ith unit vector. See the left-hand side of Figure 7 for a
picture in d = 1. For a definition of oriented site percolation, we refer to
Durrett [9] where the block construction is also reviewed in detail and em-
ployed to study different spatial processes. The existence of couplings be-
tween the spatial game and oriented percolation relies, among other things,
on the application of Theorem 4.3 in [9] which requires certain good events
to be measurable with respect to a so-called graphical representation of the
process. Therefore, we need to construct the spatial game from a graphical
representation, though we will not use it explicitly except in the last section.
To construct the process graphically, we first observe that, in view of (3), the
maximum rate at which a player gives birth over all possible configurations
is given by
max
η
φ(0, η)1{φ(0, η)> 0}=max
η
max(0, φ(0, η))
(30)
= max
(
0,max
η
φ(0, η)
)
=max
(
0,max
i,j
aij
)
.
Similarly, the maximum rate at which a player dies is
max
η
(−φ(0, η)1{φ(0, η)< 0}) = max
η
max(0,−φ(0, η))
= max
(
0,max
η
(−φ(0, η))
)
(31)
= max
(
0,max
i,j
(−aij)
)
.
From (30)–(31), we deduce that the maximum rate at which a player either
gives birth or dies over all the possible configurations is given by
m :=max
(
max
i,j
aij,max
i,j
(−aij)
)
=max
i,j
|aij |.
The process is then constructed graphically from a collection of indepen-
dent Poisson processes with intensity m by using the following well-known
property: extracting points independently with probability p from a Pois-
son point process with intensity m results in a Poisson point process with
reduced intensity p×m. More precisely, for all x ∈ Zd and n> 0:
• we let Tn(x) = the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with rate m;
• we let Un(x) = a uniform random variable over the interval (0,m);
• we let Vn(x) = a uniform random variable over the interaction neighbor-
hood Nx.
At the arrival times Tn(x), we draw
an arrow Vn(x)→ x with the label Un(x)(32)
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and say that this arrow is active whenever
Un(x)< |φ(x, ηt−)| where t := Tn(x).
Staring from any initial configuration, an argument due to Harris [14] implies
that the process can be constructed going forward in time by setting
ηt(x) = ηt(Vn(x)) :=
{
ηt−(x), when φ(x, ηt−)> 0 and (32) is active,
ηt−(Vn(x)), when φ(x, ηt−)< 0 and (32) is active,
where again t := Tn(x). In case the arrow in (32) is not active, the update
is canceled. In order to simplify a little bit some cumbersome expressions
in the proofs of the remaining three theorems, we identify from now on the
spatial game with the set of the type 1 players, which is a common approach
to study spin systems. We now focus on the proof of our coexistence result.
The first step is to establish a strong form of survival of the type 1 players
when
(M,d) 6= (1,1) and a12 = a21 = 0 and c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−1,(33)
which is done by comparing the spatial game (ξt) with a12 = a21 = 0 and one
dependent oriented site percolation. The reason for studying first the process
under assumption (33) is to prevent extinction, that is, ensure a weak form
of survival, of the set of type 1 players, which facilitates our proof of strong
survival. The full result is then deduced by using a perturbation argument.
To make the idea rigorous, we declare site (z,n) ∈H to be occupied whenever
ξcnK ∩B2(Kz,3K/5) 6=∅,
where c > 0 is a constant, and K a large integer that will be fixed later and
where B2(x, r) is the Euclidean ball with center x and radius r. Also we set
Xn := {z ∈ Zd : (z,n) ∈H and is occupied}.(34)
In view of Theorem 4.3 in Durrett [9] and the fact that the spatial game
is translation invariant in space and time, to prove that the process Xn
dominates stochastically supercritical oriented site percolation, the main
step is to show that the conditional probability
P ((e1,1) is occupied |(0,0) is occupied)
can be made arbitrarily close to one by choosing K sufficiently large. To
estimate this conditional probability, we start with a single type 1 player at
site 0 and keep track of a specific player of type 1 that moves to the target
Ke1. Let pi1 be the projection onto the first axis, and denote by
rt := max{pi1(x) :x ∈ ξt} and Rt := {x ∈ ξt :pi1(x) = rt}
the first coordinate of the rightmost type 1 players and the set of the right-
most type 1 players, respectively. Since a12 = a21 = 0, this set is always
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nonempty. In one dimension, it reduces to a singleton whereas in higher
dimensions it may have more sites. In any case, we let Xt be the position
of one of the rightmost type 1 players chosen uniformly at random among
the ones who are the closest to the first axis, and call this player the tagged
player. The key to proving that the set of type 1 players spreads in the
direction of e1 is given by the next lemma.
Lemma 12. Assume (33). Then there exists µ > 0 such that
lim
h→0
h−1E(pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt)|ξt)≥ µ almost surely.
Proof. To begin with, we introduce the process
Lt := inf{pi1(Xt − x) :x∈ ξt and x 6=Xt}.
In words, the process Lt keeps track of the distance along the first axis
between the tagged player and the second rightmost player of type 1, which is
also the length of a jump to the left of the projection on the first axis pi1(Xt)
at the time the tagged player changes her strategy. We refer the reader to
Figure 5 for a picture describing the neighborhood of Xt. To prove the
lemma, we distinguish two cases depending on the value of the process Lt.
Case 1. Assume that Lt = L ∈ [1,M ]. Then the number of type 1 neigh-
bors of the tagged player is bounded by the number of vertices in the leftmost
rectangle in the picture,
f1(Xt, ξt)≤N−1(2M +1)d−1(M −L+1).
Fig. 5. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 12.
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Therefore the rate at which the strategy at Xt changes from 1→ 2 is
c(Xt, ξt)≤N−2(−a11)max{z(N − z) : z ≤ (2M +1)d−1(M −L+1)}
=N−2(−a11)(2M +1)d−1(M −L+1)((2M +1)d−1(M +L)− 1).
Since such a transition causes the tagged player to jump L units to the left
or equivalently the first coordinate pi1(Xt) of the process Xt to decrease by
the amount L, the previous inequality also gives the following bound almost
surely on the transition rate:
lim
h→0
h−1P (pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt) =−L|ξt and Lt = L ∈ [1,M ])
(35)
≤N−2(−a11)(2M +1)d−1(M −L+ 1)((2M +1)d−1(M +L)− 1).
In addition, each site x occupied by a player of type 2 in the neighborhood of
Xt has at least one neighbor of type 1, namely the tagged player, therefore
the rate at which the strategy at such a neighbor x changes from 2→ 1 is
at least equal to
c(x, ξt)≥N−2(−a22)min{z(N − z) : z 6= 0}
=N−2(−a22)(N − 1) =N−2(−a22)((2M +1)d − 2).
Since such a transition causes the tagged player to jump to x when pi1(x)>
pi1(Xt) and since the number of such neighbors of the tagged player is given
by
card{x ∈NXt :pi1(x) = pi1(Xt) + j and x /∈ ξt}= (2M + 1)d−1
for all j = 1,2, . . . ,M , we deduce that
lim
h→0
h−1P (pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt) = j|ξt)
(36)
≥N−2(−a22)((2M +1)d − 2)(2M +1)d−1
almost surely for all j = 1,2, . . . ,M . Using as previously mentioned that (35)
is the only transition that can decrease the first coordinate of the tagged
player and summing the transition rates in (36) over all the possible values
of j, we deduce that, almost surely,
lim
h→0
h−1E(pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt)|ξt and Lt = L ∈ [1,M ])
≥ (−L) lim
h→0
h−1P (pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt) =−L|ξt and Lt =L ∈ [1,M ])
+
M∑
j=1
j lim
h→0
h−1P (pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt) = j|ξt)
≥ (−L)N−2(−a11)(2M +1)d−1(M −L+1)((2M +1)d−1(M +L)− 1)
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+
M∑
j=1
jN−2(−a22)((2M +1)d − 2)(2M +1)d−1.
Expanding and simplifying the right-hand side gives
lim
h→0
h−1E(pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt)|ξt and Lt =L ∈ [1,M ])
≥N−2(2M +1)d−1[a11L(M −L+ 1)((2M +1)d−1(M +L)− 1)
− a22(1/2)M(M +1)((2M +1)d − 2)].
Using that L(M −L+1)≤ (1/4)(M +1)2 and M +L≤ 2M , we obtain
lim
h→0
h−1E(pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt)|ξt and Lt =L ∈ [1,M ])
≥N−2(2M +1)d−1[a11(1/4)(M +1)2(2M(2M +1)d−1 − 1)
− a22(1/2)M(M +1)((2M + 1)d − 2)]
=N−2(2M +1)d−1(1/4)(M +1)
× (a11(M +1)(2M(2M + 1)d−1 − 1)− a22(2M)((2M +1)d − 2))
=N−2(2M +1)d−1(1/4)(M +1)2(2M(2M +1)d−1 − 1)
× (a11 − c(M,d)a22)> 0
almost surely whenever (33) holds.
Case 2. Assume that Lt = L /∈ [1,M ]. Then we have the following alter-
native:
• L= 0, and then there are at least two vertices in the set Rt.
• L>M , and then the tagged player has only type 2 players in her neigh-
borhood and therefore changes her strategy at rate zero.
In either case, pi1(Xt) cannot decrease, so (36) implies that
lim
h→0
h−1E(pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt)|ξt and Lt = L /∈ [1,M ])
≥
M∑
j=1
j lim
h→0
h−1P (pi1(Xt+h)− pi1(Xt) = j|ξt)
≥N−2(2M + 1)d−1(1/4)(M + 1)(−a22)(2M)((2M +1)d − 2)> 0
almost surely whenever (33) holds. This completes the proof. 
The previous lemma is similar to pages 1247–1248 in [24]. There, the
authors conclude that we can bring a particle—the tagged player in our
case—close to the target Ke1. This is obvious in one dimension. In higher
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dimensions, the idea is to use the lemma to increase the first coordinate of
the tagged player up to K and then apply the lemma again along each of
the other d− 1 axes to bring the tagged player close to the target. However,
since we do not have control on the position of the tagged player in the
direction orthogonal to e1 while moving along the first axis, the conclusion
is not obvious. To prove that we can bring a type 1 player close to the target
in higher dimensions, we look instead at the Euclidean distance between the
target and the type 1 player the closest to the target. We now call Xt the
position of one of the type 1 players chosen uniformly at random among the
ones who are the closest to Ke1, called again the tagged player, and prove
that
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(Dt+h −Dt|Xt = x)≤−µ for some µ > 0,(37)
where Dt := dist(Xt,Ke1) = Euclidean distance between Xt and Ke1 and
where ΩK is a set of configurations in which the tagged player is far from
the target,
ΩK := {η ⊂ Zd :η ∩B2(Ke1,K/5) =∅} for K large.
Although our proof relies on basic trigonometry, the algebra is somewhat
messy, so we only prove the result in the two-dimensional nearest neighbor
case. Hopefully, the next lemma will convince the reader that, even if the
players are located on a square lattice, the type 1 players spread not only
along each axis but also along any arbitrary direction provided condition
(33) holds.
Lemma 13. Assume that (M,d) = (1,2), and (33) holds. Then, (37)
holds for all K large.
Proof. The proof is based on the construction given in Figure 6. Let:
C := the circle with center Ke1 going through Xt,
∆ := the tangent line to the circle C going through Xt,
Γ := the straight line parallel to the tangent ∆ going through Ke1.
The first ingredient is to observe that, on the event that ξt ∈ΩK ,
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(Dt+h −Dt|Xt = x)
(38)
≈ lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
when the parameter K is large, so it suffices to prove the result for the
right-hand side. To estimate the drift, note that the straight line ∆ divides
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the neighborhood of Xt into two sets of four vertices: as indicated on the
left-hand side of the figure, we denote by yi the four vertices the closest to
the target Ke1 and we denote by xi the other four vertices in such a way
that
li := dist(yi,∆)= dist(xi,∆) for i= 1,2,3,4.
Defining the angle θ as in the picture, some basic trigonometry shows that
l1 = (1− tan θ) cosθ, l2 = cos θ,
(39)
l3 = (1+ tan θ) cosθ, l4 = tan θ cos θ.
We may assume that 0≤ θ ≤ pi/4 and so tan θ ∈ [0,1] since any other config-
uration can be deduced from a rotation of this configuration. Note that all
four players at sites yi must follow strategy 2, which gives 2
4 = 16 possible
configurations in the neighborhood of Xt. To find a bound for the drift, we
only distinguish four types of configurations (see Figure 6).
• Case 1. Assume that x4 ∈ ξt. Then
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
≤ (−a11)(16/64)l4 − (−a22)
× ((12/64)l1 + (12/64)l2 + (7/64)l3 + (7/64)l4).
Using (39), we deduce that
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
Fig. 6. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 13.
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≤ (1/64) cos θ(−a11(16 tan θ) + a22(31 + 2tan θ))< 0
whenever a11 > (33/16)a22 which holds if a11 > c(1,2)a22 = (7/5)a22 .
• Case 2. Assume that x4 /∈ ξt and x1 ∈ ξt. Then
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
≤ (1/64) cos θ(−a11 × 15l1 + a22 × (7l1 +7l2 +7l3 +12l4))
= (1/64) cos θ(−a11(15− 15 tan θ) + a22(21 + 12 tan θ))< 0
whenever a11 > c(1,2)a22 = (7/5)a22 .
• Case 3. Assume that x4, x1 /∈ ξt and x2 ∈ ξt. Then
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
≤ (1/64) cos θ(−a11 × 12l2 + a22 × (7l1 +7l2 +7l3 + 12l4))
= (1/64) cos θ(−12a11 + a22(21 + 12 tan θ))< 0
whenever a11 > (7/4)a22 which holds if a11 > c(1,2)a22 = (7/5)a22 .
• Case 4. Assume that x4, x1, x2 /∈ ξt and x3 ∈ ξt. Then
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(dist(Xt+h,Γ)− dist(Xt,Γ)|Xt = x)
≤ (1/64) cos θ(−a11 × 7l2 + a22 × (7l1 +7l2 +7l3 + 7l4))
= (1/64) cos θ(−a11(7 + 7tan θ) + a22(21 + 7tan θ))< 0
whenever a11 > 2a22 which holds if a11 > c(1,2)a22 = (7/5)a22.
This, together with the approximation (38), implies the lemma. 
We now use Lemmas 12 and 13 to prove that, with probability close to
one when K is large, the tagged player is located in a certain Euclidean ball
with center Ke1 at a deterministic time proportional to K. This is done in
Lemmas 14–16 below where we successively prove that the tagged player
hits a subset of the target region in a short time, does not leave a certain
larger ball centered at zero, and stays in the target region for a long time.
The second step is needed to ensure that the events under consideration are
measurable with respect to the graphical representation in a finite space–
time box, which is a key to obtaining a coupling between the process and
oriented percolation with a finite range of dependence. For every positive
integer K, define
τK := inf{t :Xt ∈B2(Ke1,2K/5)} = inf{t :Dt < 2K/5}.
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Lemma 14. Assume (33). There exist c,C1 <∞ and γ1 > 0 such that
P (τK ≥ cK|X0 ∈B2(0,3K/5)) ≤C1 exp(−γ1K) for all K large.
Proof. According to Lemmas 12 and 13,
lim
h→0
sup
x/∈B2(Ke1,K/5)
h−1E(Dt+h −Dt|Xt = x)≤−µ for some µ> 0(40)
from which it follows that
EDt ≤D0 − µt for all t < µ−1(D0 −K/5).
Using in addition that the number of jumps of the process (Dt) dominates
stochastically the number of jumps of a Poisson process with positive inten-
sity, large deviation estimates for the Poisson distribution imply that
P (τK ≥ 2µ−1K|X0 ∈B2(0,3K/5))
≤ P (Dt ≥K/5 for all t < 2µ−1K|D0 ≤ 7K/5)≤C1 exp(−γ1K)
for suitable constants C1 <∞ and γ1 > 0 and all K sufficiently large. 
Lemma 15. Assume (33). There exist C2 <∞ and γ2 > 0 such that
P (Dt ≥ 2K for some t ∈ (0, cK)|X0 ∈B2(0,3K/5)) ≤C2 exp(−γ2K)
for all K sufficiently large, and where c is as in Lemma 14.
Proof. First, we introduce the stopping times
σK := inf{t :Dt ≥ 2K} and TK := inf(τK , σK)
and the process stopped at time TK
Zt := exp(aDt)1{t < TK}+ exp(aDTK )1{t≥ TK}.
As in Lemma 6, the key to the proof is to find a constant a > 0 such that
the process (Zt) is a supermartingale with respect to the natural filtration
of the process (ξt) and then apply the optimal stopping theorem. To prove
the existence of such a constant, we introduce
Φ(a) := lim
h→0
h−1E(Zt+h(a)−Zt(a)|ξt)
and observe that, for all t < TK ,
Φ(a) =
∑
x∈Zd
(exp(adist(Xt + x,Ke1))− exp(adist(Xt,Ke1)))
× lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt = x|ξt).
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Recalling (40) and using that Dt ≥K/5 for all t < TK , we deduce that
Φ′(0) =
∑
x∈Zd
(dist(Xt + x,Ke1)− dist(Xt,Ke1)) lim
h→0
h−1P (Xt+h −Xt = x|ξt)
= lim
h→0
h−1E(Dt+h −Dt|ξt)≤−µ< 0 almost surely.
Since in addition Φ(0) = 0, there exists a0 > 0 fixed from now on such that
Φ(a0) := lim
h→0
h−1E(Zt+h −Zt|ξt)≤ 0 almost surely,
which implies that (Zt) is a supermartingale for this value of a. Since the
stopping time TK is almost surely finite, the optimal stopping theorem fur-
ther implies that
EZTK ≤ EZ0 =E exp(a0X0)≤ exp(a0(K +3K/5)) = exp(a0(8K/5)),
EZTK ≥ exp(2a0K)P (σK < τK) + exp(a0(2K/5−M))P (τK < σK)
≥ exp(2a0K)P (σK < τK) + exp(a0(2K/5−M))(1− P (σK < τK))
from which we deduce that
P (σK < τK)≤ [exp(a0(8K/5))− exp(a0(2K/5−M))]
× [exp(2a0K)− exp(2a0(2K/5−M))]−1
= [exp(a0(6K/5 +M)− 1)][exp(a0(8K/5 +M)− 1)]−1
≤ exp(−2a0K/5).
Since the probability that the number of jumps of the tagged player by time
cK exceeds a certain multiple of K also has exponential decay, the result
follows. 
Lemma 16. Assume (33). There exist C3 <∞ and γ3 > 0 such that
P (Dt ≥ 3K/5 for some t ∈ (τK , cK)|τK < cK)≤C3 exp(−γ3K)
for all K sufficiently large.
Proof. The result directly follows by observing that
P (Dt ≥ 3K/5 for some t ∈ (τK , cK)|τK < cK)
≤ P (Dt ≥ 3K/5 for some t ∈ (0, cK)|D0 < 2K/5)
and by following the argument of the proof of Lemma 15 but using
τ ′K := inf{t :Dt <K/5} and σ′K := inf{t :Dt ≥ 3K/5}
in place of the stopping times τK and σK . 
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With Lemmas 14–16, we are now ready to couple the process properly
rescaled in space and time with oriented site percolation. Denote by W1−εn
the set of wet sites at level n in a one dependent oriented site percolation
process on H1 in which sites are open with probability 1− ε. Recall that a
site is said to be wet if it can be reached from level zero by a path of open
sites.
Lemma 17. Assume (33), and let ε > 0. Then, for all K sufficiently
large, the process can be coupled with oriented site percolation in such a way
that
W
1−ε
n ⊂Xn for all n≥ 0 whenever X0 =W1−ε0 .
Proof. Let Ω(z,n) denote the event that site (z,n) ∈H is occupied,
that is,
ξcnK ∩B2(Kz,3K/5) 6=∅.
Lemmas 14 and 16 imply the existence of a collection of events G(z,n)
measurable with respect to the graphical representation of the process such
that:
(1) for all K sufficiently large, P (G(z,n))≥ 1− ε, and such that
(2) we have the inclusions of events
G(z,n) ∩Ω(z,n)⊂Ω(z ± ei, n+ 1) for all i= 1,2, . . . , d.
In addition, Lemma 15 implies that these events can be chosen so that
(3) G(z,n) is measurable with respect to the graphical representation in
B2(Kz,2K)× [cnK, c(n+1)K] = (Kz, cnK) +B2(0,2K)× [0, cK].
These are the assumptions of Theorem 4.3 in Durrett [9], from which the
existence of the coupling between the two processes directly follows. 
In the next lemma, which recalls the statement of Theorem 5, we return
to the process with general payoffs. The proof relies on the previous lemma,
the symmetry of the evolution rules of the spatial game and a perturbation
argument.
Lemma 18. For all a12 and a21 there exists m> 0 such that coexistence
occurs when
c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−m and c(M,d)a11 < a22 <−m.
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Proof. First, we fix ε < (1/2)(1−pc) positive where pc < 1 is the critical
value of the oriented site percolation process introduced above. To prove that
both strategies can survive simultaneously, we extend our previous definition
of occupied site by calling (z,n) ∈H a good site whenever
x ∈ ηcnK and y /∈ ηcnK for some x, y ∈B2(Kz,3K/5).
Denote by Yn the set of good sites at level n. The symmetry of the evolution
rules implies that the conclusion of Lemma 17 holds for Yn provided that
a12 = a21 = 0 and c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−1 and
(41)
c(M,d)a11 < a22 <−1.
Even though (weak) survival of both strategies when a12 = a21 = 0 is in fact
trivial since in this case a player isolated from players of her own type cannot
change her strategy, we point out that the coupling with oriented site perco-
lation is needed to obtain the full coexistence region. Indeed, the parameter
K being fixed such that the process dominates one dependent oriented site
percolation with parameter 1− ε, the continuity of the transition rates with
respect to the payoffs implies the existence of a small ρ = ρ(K) > 0 and a
coupling of the processes such that
W
1−2ε
n ⊂Yn for all n≥ 0 whenever Y0 =W1−2ε0(42)
in a perturbation of the parameter region (41) given by
− ρ < a12, a21 < ρ and c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−1 and
(43)
c(M,d)a11 < a22 <−1.
In particular, letting f : 2H = power set of H→{0,1} be defined by
f({Wn :n≥ 0}) := 1{card(n : z ∈Wn) =∞ for all z ∈ Zd}(44)
and using (42) and the monotonicity of f , we obtain that for all (x, t) ∈
Z
d ×R+,
P (x ∈ ηs1 and x /∈ ηs2 for some s1, s2 > t)
≥ P (card(n : z ∈Yn) =∞ for all z ∈ Zd) =Ef({Yn :n≥ 0})
≥Ef({W1−2εn :n≥ 0}) = P (card(n : z ∈W1−2εn ) =∞ for all z ∈ Zd) = 1
since infinitely many sites are wet at level zero and 1− 2ε > pc. Note also
that the first inequality follows from the fact that if a site is good, then the
corresponding space–time region obtained through rescaling contains both
strategies, so the probability that any given vertex x in this region changes
its strategy after one time unit is bounded from below by a positive constant.
This proves coexistence of both strategies in the parameter region (43). To
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deal with the general case when both payoffs a12 and a21 are arbitrary, we
fix a sufficiently large m> 0 such that
a12 ∈ (−mρ,mρ) and a21 ∈ (−mρ,mρ).
Since the long-term behavior remains unchanged by speeding up time by
m, that is, multiplying all the payoffs by the same factor m, we obtain
coexistence in the parameter region
c(M,d)a22 < a11 <−m and c(M,d)a11 < a22 <−m.
This proves the lemma and Theorem 5. 
5. Proof of Theorem 2. This section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 2. We first prove that, under the assumption of the theorem, strategy 1
survives. The key to obtaining this partial result is to observe that, when
the first payoff a11 = 1 while the other payoffs are equal to zero, the spatial
game starting from suitable initial configurations dominates stochastically
a Richardson model [30]. To also prove extinction of strategy 2, we use an
idea of Lanchier [17] that extends from discrete-time to continuous-time pro-
cesses a result of Durrett [8] which states that sites which are not wet do not
percolate for oriented site percolation models in which sites are open with
probability close to one. Throughout this section, to shorten a little bit the
expression of certain events, we let
Br := [−r, r]d for all r > 0.
The spatial boxes involved in the block construction in both this section and
the next section are translations of these boxes for an appropriate radius r.
Lemma 19. Let ε > 0 and a11 = 1. Then there exist K,c, ρ > 0 such that
P (ηt 6⊃B2K for some t ∈ (cK,2cK)|η0 ⊃BK)≤ ε for all a¯11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3.
Proof. We introduce the following auxiliary processes:
• the spatial game ξt with payoffs a11 = 1 and a¯11 = 0 and
• the Richardson model ζt with flip rate
cRM(x, ζ) = β
2f1(x, ζ)1{x /∈ ζ} where β := ((2M +1)d − 1)−1.
In the process ξt all type 2 players have a zero payoff while each type 1
player with at least one type 1 neighbor has a payoff equal to β from which
it follows that
cSG(x, ξ) = 0 if x ∈ ξ,
cSG(x, ξ)≥ β2 if x /∈ ξ and f1(y, ξ) 6= 0 for some y ∈ ξ ∩Nx.
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON THE LATTICE 37
Since in addition the property that each type 1 player has at least one
type 1 neighbor is preserved by the dynamics of the processes, we deduce
the existence of a coupling (ζ, ξ) such that
P (ζt ⊂ ξt|ζ0 = ξ0 =BK) = 1.(45)
In other respects, the shape theorem [30] for the Richardson model implies
the existence of a positive constant c > 0 fixed from now on such that
P (ζt 6⊃B2K for some t ∈ (cK,2cK)|ζ0 ⊃BK)
= P (ζcK 6⊃B2K |ζ0 ⊃BK)
≤ P (ζcK 6⊃B2K |ζ0 = {0})≤ ε/2 for all K large,
where the equality between the first two lines holds because infected sites
in the Richardson model do not recover. In view of (45), the same holds for
the spatial game, that is,
P (ξt 6⊃B2K for some t ∈ (cK,2cK)|ξ0 ⊃BK)≤ ε/2(46)
for all K large. Now, we fix K such that (46) holds. The scale parameter
K and the constant c being fixed, the continuity of the transition rates of
the spatial game with respect to the payoffs implies the existence of a small
constant ρ > 0 and a coupling (η, ξ) such that
P (ηt ∩B2K 6= ξt ∩B2K for some t≤ 2cK|η0 = ξ0)≤ ε/2(47)
whenever a¯11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3. Combining (46) and (47) gives
P (ηt 6⊃B2K for some t ∈ (cK,2cK)|η0 ⊃BK)
≤ P (ξt 6⊃B2K for some t ∈ (cK,2cK)|ξ0 ⊃BK)
+ P (ηt ∩B2K 6= ξt ∩B2K for some t≤ 2cK|η0 = ξ0)
≤ ε
for all a11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3. This completes the proof. 
To deduce survival of strategy 1 from Lemma 19 and under the assump-
tions of the lemma, we now declare a site (z,n) ∈H to be occupied whenever
x ∈ ηt for all (x, t) ∈ (Kz, cnK) +BK × (0, cK)
and define the set Xn of occupied sites at level n as in (34). Repeating the
proof of Lemma 17 but using Lemma 19 in place of Lemmas 14–16 directly
gives the following result.
Lemma 20. Let ε > 0 and a11 = 1. Then there exist K,c, ρ > 0 and a
coupling of the spatial game with one dependent oriented site percolation
such that
W
1−ε
n ⊂Xn for all n whenever X0 =W1−ε0 and a¯11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3.
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Taking ε > 0 strictly smaller than one minus the critical value of one
dependent oriented site percolation, and using the coupling given in the
previous lemma for this value of ε as well as the monotone function f defined
in (44), we obtain that, for all (x, t) ∈ Zd×R+
P (x ∈ ηs for some s > t)
≥ P (card(n : z ∈Xn) =∞ for all z ∈ Zd) =Ef({Xn :n≥ 0})
≥Ef({W1−εn :n≥ 0}) = P (card(n : z ∈W1−εn ) =∞ for all z ∈ Zd) = 1.
This proves that strategy 1 survives but not that it wins since there is
a positive density of closed sites, which does not exclude the possibility of
having a positive density of sites which are not occupied, and so the presence
of type 2 players, at arbitrarily large times. To prove extinction of the type 2
players, we use the coupling above together with an idea of Lanchier [17]
that extends a result of Durrett [8]. This is done in the next lemma.
Lemma 21. Let a11 = 1. Then, there exists ρ > 0 small such that
lim
t→∞
P (x /∈ ηt) = 0 for all x ∈ Zd whenever a¯11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3.
Proof. Following an idea of Lanchier [17] we introduce the new oriented
graph H2 with the same vertex set as the oriented graph H1 but in which
there is an oriented edge
(z,n)→ (z′, n′)
if and only if (z′ = z ± ei for some i= 1,2, . . . , d and n′ = n+1)
or (z′ = z± 2ei for some i= 1,2, . . . , d and n′ = n).
See the right-hand side of Figure 7 for a picture in d= 1. We say that a site
is dry if it is not wet for oriented site percolation on the graph H1. Also, we
write
(w,0)→j (z,n) for j = 1,2,
and say that there is a dry path in Hj connecting both sites if there exist
(z0,0) = (w,0), (z1, n1), . . . , (zk−1, nk−1), (zk, nk) = (z,n) ∈H
such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) (zi, ni)→ (zi+1, ni+1) is an oriented edge in Hj for all i= 0,1, . . . , k−
1, and
(2) the site (zi, ni) is dry for all i= 0,1, . . . , k.
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Fig. 7. Picture of the graphs H1 and H2 in dimension d= 1.
Note that a dry path in H1 is also a dry path in H2, but the reciprocal is
false since the latter has more oriented edges than the former. The key to
the proof is the following result: if sites are closed with probability ε > 0
sufficiently small, then
lim
n→∞P ((w,0)→2 (z,n) for some w ∈ Z
d) = 0.(48)
In other words, if the density of open sites is close enough to one then dry
sites do not percolate even with the additional edges in H2. The proof for
dry paths in the graph H1 directly follows from Lemmas 4–11 in Durrett
[8] but as pointed out in [17], the proof easily extends to give the analog for
dry paths in the oriented graph H2. To complete the proof, the last step is
to show the connection between dry paths and occupied sites. Assume that
x /∈ ηt for some (x, t) ∈ (Kz, cnK) +BK × (0, cK),(49)
where (z,n) ∈H . Since a type 1 player can only change her strategy if there
is a type 2 player in her neighborhood, the event in (49) implies the existence
of
x0, x1, . . . , xm = x∈ Zd and s0 = 0< s1 < · · ·< sm+1 = t
such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) for all j = 0,1, . . . ,m, we have xj /∈ ηs for s ∈ [sj, sj+1], and
(2) for all j = 0,1, . . . ,m− 1, we have xj+1 ∈Nxj .
In particular, the spatial game being coupled with one dependent oriented
site percolation as in Lemma 20, the event in (49) implies that there exists
a dry path
(w,0)→2 (z,n) for some w ∈ Zd(50)
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provided that the range M ≤K. Note, however, that this does not imply
the existence of a dry path in the graph H1, which is the reason why we
introduced a new graph with additional edges. In conclusion, the event in
(49) is a subset of the event (50). Since in addition ε can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing the parameter K sufficiently large according to Lemma 20,
taking the probability of the two events above and using (48) implies that
lim
t→∞
P (x /∈ ηt)≤ lim
n→∞P ((w,0)→2 (z,n) for some w ∈ Z
d) = 0
for all x∈ Zd where (z,n) is as in (49). This completes the proof. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, we let ρ > 0 as in the previous
lemma. Then, having arbitrary payoffs a12 and a21 and a22, there exists m
large such that a¯11 ∈ (−mρ,mρ). Since in addition the limiting behavior of
the spatial game remains unchanged by speeding up time, Lemma 21 implies
that strategy 1 wins for all a11 >m.
6. Proof of Theorem 3. This section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 3. The intuition behind this result is simple, though the arguments to
make the proof rigorous are somewhat more challenging. To understand the
theorem heuristically, observe that, in the limiting case a11 =−∞ and pro-
vided one starts from a suitable initial configuration, the process becomes
instantaneously sparse: configurations where two type 1 players are neigh-
bors are not possible. Since in addition type 2 players can only change their
strategy when they are located in the neighborhood of at least one type 1
player, the process is dominated by a system of annihilating particles: as
long as several particles are in the same interaction neighborhood, one of
them is instantaneously killed. In particular, the density of type 1 players
can only decrease. Under the assumption a12 < 0, these particles also die
spontaneously, which implies that the density of type 1 players decreases to
zero.
The main difficulty to prove the theorem is to extend this heuristic argu-
ment to the nonlimiting case when the payoff a11 is small but different from
−∞. We start with some key definitions and a brief overview of the global
strategy of our proof. Identifying again configurations with the set of type 1
players, we say that a set/configuration η is sparse whenever
x, y ∈ η implies that y /∈Nx.
We also say that configuration η is sparse in B if the set η∩B is sparse. For
the spatial game, we say that there is a type 1 invasion path (x, r) (y, t)
if there are
x0 = x,x1, . . . , xn = y ∈ Zd and s0 = r < s1 < · · ·< sn < sn+1 = t ∈R+
such that the following three conditions hold:
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• for i= 0,1, . . . , n, we have xi ∈ ηs for all si ≤ s≤ si+1;
• for i= 1,2, . . . , n, we have xi /∈ ηsi−;
• for i= 1,2, . . . , n, we have xi ∈Nxi−1 .
Note that there exists a type 1 invasion path (x,0) (y, t) if and only if
the player at site y at time t follows strategy 1 since type 2 players can only
change their strategy if they are in the neighborhood of a type 1 player.
Finally, we call an invasion path:
• an inner path whenever xi ∈B4K−M for all i= 0,1, . . . , n,
• an outer path whenever xi /∈B4K for all i= 0,1, . . . , n,
• a transversal path whenever xi ∈B4K \B4K−M for some i= 0,1, . . . , n.
To prove extinction of strategy 1 using a block construction, the main in-
gredient is to prove that if the region BK is empty initially, then the region
B2K will, with probability close to one for suitable parameters, be empty
at a later time that we choose to be 2
√
K . To show this result, we observe
that, since type 1 players are located on type 1 invasion paths, it suffices to
prove that:
(1) the probability that an inner path lasts more than 2
√
K units of time
is small, and
(2) the probability that a transversal path reaches B2K by time 2
√
K is
small.
Note that outer paths are unimportant in proving the theorem because,
by definition, they do not reach the target region. The proof of the second
assertion simply relies on the fact that, with probability close to one when
K is large, and regardless of the value of the payoffs, invasion paths expand
at most linearly. The proof of the first assertion is more involved and is
divided into three steps. First, we show that the process is sparse in B4K
by time 1, then that it is sparse a positive fraction of time in this box until
time 2
√
K , and finally that conditional on this previous event, inner paths
die out exponentially fast. Throughout this section:
• S denotes the set of sparse configurations,
• Ωin is the event that there is an inner path from time 0 to time 2
√
K and
• Ωtr is the event that a transversal path reaches B2K by time 2
√
K .
To begin with, we prove that if the region BK is initially void in type 1
players, then the process becomes sparse in B4K after a short time.
Lemma 22. Let ε > 0. For all K, there exists m1 :=m1(ε,K, a¯11)<∞
such that
P (ηs ∩B4K ∈ S for some s ∈ (0,1)|η0 ∩BK =∅)≥ 1− ε/3
for all a11 <−m1.
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Proof. To begin with, we observe that when a11 =−1 and a¯11 = 0:
• type 1 players with at least one type 1 neighbor and at least one type 2
neighbor change their strategy at a positive rate whereas
• type 2 players all have a zero payoff, so they do not change their strategy.
This implies that there exists a := a(ε)> 0 such that, for all K > 0,
P (ηaK ∩B4K /∈ S|η0 ∩BK =∅)≤ ε/6 when a¯11 = 0,
which in turn implies the existence of ρ := ρ(K,ε) such that
P (ηaK ∩B4K /∈ S|η0 ∩BK =∅)≤ ε/3 for all a¯11 ∈ (−ρ, ρ)3.(51)
For arbitrary a¯11, we fix m1 :=m1(a¯11, ρ) such that
a¯11 ∈ (−m1ρ,m1ρ)3 and m1 > aK.
Then, (51) directly implies that
P (ηs ∩B4K /∈ S|η0 ∩BK =∅)≤ ε/3
for all a11 <−m1 and for s= aK/m1 < 1, which proves the lemma. 
Before proving that inner paths die out exponentially fast, we need an
additional preliminary result that ensures that the configuration in B4K
is almost sparse for a large amount of time when a11 is small. The proof
slightly differs depending on the sign of the two payoffs a22 and a21. Since
the proof when these two payoffs are negative is more difficult and requires
additional arguments, we only focus on this case. Under this assumption and
the assumptions of the theorem, all four payoffs are negative, in which case
all the players have a positive death rate and the graphical representation
of the process can be reformulated in the following manner. We introduce
the following collections of independent random variables: for all x ∈ Zd and
i, j = 1,2 and n > 0:
• we let Tn(x, i, j) = the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with rate
−aij ;
• we let Un(x, i, j) = a uniform random variable over the interaction neigh-
borhood Nx;
• we let Vn(x, i, j) = a uniform random variable over the interaction neigh-
borhood Nx.
At the arrival times Tn(x, i, j), we draw
an arrow Vn(x, i, j)→ x with the label (Un(x, i, j), i, j)(52)
and say that this arrow is active whenever
ηt−(x) = i and ηt−(Un(x, i, j)) = j where t := Tn(x, i, j).
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Given an initial configuration and a realization of this graphical representa-
tion, the process can be constructed going forward in time by setting
ηt(x) := ηt−(Vn(x, i, j)) if the arrow in (52) is active,
ηt(x) := ηt−(x) if the arrow in (52) is not active,
where again t := Tn(x, i, j). For any given K > 0, we let τ0 = 0 and
τi := inf{Tn(x,2, j)> τi−1 for some n> 0 and x ∈B4K and j = 1,2},
ρi := (1/2)(τi + τi+1) for i≥ 1
and say that the arrow at time τi is good whenever
there is at least one (x,1,1)-arrow z′→ z
for all z ∈Nx and all z′ ∈Nz between time τi and time ρi,
where vertex x is the vertex fixed while defining τi. Note that if the arrow
at time τi is good, and the configuration in B4K is sparse just before τi, and
the player at x becomes of type 1 at time τi, then all the type 1 players in
the neighborhood of x become of type 2 by time ρi unless the player at x
changes her strategy before. In either case, the configuration will be sparse
in B4K between the two times ρi and τi+1. Define the stopping time
σK := inf{τi : the arrow at time τi is not good}.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let ε > 0. For all K, there exists m2 :=m2(ε,K, a¯11)<∞
such that
P (σK < 2
√
K)≤ ε/6 for all a11 <−m2.
Proof. First, we observe that
J := sup{j : τj < 2
√
K}=Poisson(−2(a21 + a22)
√
K(8K +1)d)
and fix m :=m(ε,K, a¯11) such that
P (J >m)≤ ε/18.(53)
Letting ρ := ρ(ε,K, a¯11) =−ε(36m(a21 + a22)(8K +1)d)−1 and using that
τi+1− τi =Exponential(−(a21 + a22)(8K + 1)d),
we also have
P (τi+1 − τi < 2ρ for some i= 0,1, . . . , J − 1|J ≤m)
≤ P (τi+1 − τi < 2ρ for some i= 0,1, . . . ,m− 1)
(54)
≤m(1− exp(2(a21 + a22)(8K +1)dρ))
≤−2m(a21 + a22)(8K + 1)dρ= ε/18.
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Finally, since for all x ∈B4K , all z ∈Nx and all z′ ∈Nz,
P (there is no (x,1,1)-arrow z′→ z between time τi and time τi + ρ)
= P (Exponential(−a11(2M + 1)−2d)> ρ) = exp(a11(2M +1)−2dρ)
defining m2 :=m2(ε,K, a¯11) by
m2 :=−(2M +1)2dρ−1 ln(ε(18m(2M +1)2d)−1)> 0,
we obtain the conditional probability
P (σK <
√
K|J ≤m and τi+1 − τi > 2ρ for all i= 0,1, . . . , J − 1)
≤mP (the arrow at time τi is not good |τi+1 − τi > 2ρ)(55)
≤m(2M +1)2d exp(a11(2M +1)−2dρ)≤ ε/18
for all a11 < −m2. The result follows by observing that the probability to
be estimated is smaller than the sum of the three probabilities in (53)–(55).

With Lemma 23 in hand, we are now ready to prove that the conditional
probability given that the initial configuration is sparse, that an inner path
lasts more than 2
√
K units of time is small when the scaling parameter K
is large, and the payoff a11 is small.
Lemma 24. Let ε > 0 and a12 < 0. Then
P (Ωin|η0 ∩B4k ∈ S)≤ ε/3 for all K large and a11 <−m2.
Proof. Recall that ρj := (1/2)(τj + τj+1) and introduce the set-valued
process
Qt := {y ∈B4K : there is an inner path (x,0) (y, t) for some x ∈B4K}.
As pointed out above, if η0 ∩B4K is sparse and σK > 2
√
K, then:
• Qt ⊂ ηt ∩B4K is sparse for all t ∈ (ρj, τj+1), j = 0,1, . . . , J − 1, and
• cardQρj ≤ cardQτj for all j = 1,2, . . . , J .
Since in addition type 1 players with only type 2 neighbors (which is the
case for all type 1 players in sparse configurations) change their strategy at
rate −a12,
lim
h→0
h−1P (Qt+h =Qt − {y}) =−a12 for all t ∈ (ρj , τj+1) and y ∈Qt.
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Using also that Qt is sparse for at least
√
K time units before time 2
√
K ,
we obtain
P (Ωin|η0 ∩B4K ∈ S and σK > 2
√
K)
= P (Qt 6=∅ for all t ∈ (0,2
√
K)|η0 ∩B4K ∈ S and σK > 2
√
K)
≤ (cardB4K)P (Exponential(−a12)>
√
K)
= (cardB4K) exp(a12
√
K)≤ ε/6
for allK large enough. In particular, for all suchK and all a11 <−m2(ε,K, a¯11),
P (Ωin|η0 ∩B4K ∈ S)≤ P (Ωin|η0 ∩B4K ∈ S and σK > 2
√
K) +P (σK < 2
√
K)
≤ ε/6 + ε/6 = ε/3
according to Lemma 22. This completes the proof. 
The next lemma shows the analog for transversal paths: with probability
close to one, none of the transversal paths reaches the target region B2K by
time 2
√
K .
Lemma 25. Let ε > 0 and a12 < 0. For all K large, P (Ωtr)≤ ε/3.
Proof. We introduce the rates
µK :=−2
√
K(a21 + a22) card(B4K \B4K−M)> 0,
νK :=−2
√
K(a21 + a22)> 0.
First, we observe that
mK := the number of (x,2, j)-arrows
that point at the region (B4K \B4K−M )× (0,2
√
K)
= Poisson(µK)
from which it follows that
P (mK > 2µK)≤ ε/6 for all K sufficiently large.(56)
Now, let nl be the number of type 1 invasion paths of length l
(x, t) (y,2
√
K)
(57)
starting from some (x, t) ∈ (B4K \B4K−M)× (0,2
√
K),
and observe that, on the event that mK ≤ 2µK , we have
nl ≤ 2µK(2M + 1)ld
(58)
=−4
√
K(a21 + a22)(2M +1)
ld card(B4K \B4K−M).
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In addition, if in (57) site y ∈B2K , then the length must be at least
l≥ (2K −M)/M ≥K/M.
Also, since each type 2 player changes her strategy at rate at most −(a21+
a22), the probability of any given type 1 invasion path (57) of length at least
l≥K/M is bounded by
P (Poisson(νK)≥ l) =
∞∑
n=l
(νnK/n!)e
−νK ≤ 2(νlK/l!)e−νK
≤ (4e−νK/
√
2pil)(l−1eνK)
l ≤ (l−1eνK)l
(59)
≤ (K−1eMνK)l
= (−2(a21 + a22)eM/
√
K)l
for all K sufficiently large where the second inequality follows from Stirling’s
formula. To complete the proof of the lemma, we combine (56), (58) and (59)
to obtain
P (Ωtr)≤ P (mK > 2µK) +P (Ωtr|mK ≤ 2µK)
≤ ε/6 +
∞∑
l=K/M
2µK((2M +1)
d(−2(a21 + a22)eM/
√
K))l ≤ ε/3
for all K sufficiently large. 
Having proved Lemmas 22–25, we are now ready to compare the process
with oriented site percolation and deduce almost sure extinction of strat-
egy 1. The final part of the proof follows from the same arguments as for
Lemma 21. We say that a site (z,n) ∈H is void whenever
η2n
√
K ∩ (Kz +BK) =∅
and define the set Xn of void sites at level n by
Xn := {z ∈ Zd : (z,n) ∈H and is void}.
The coupling with oriented site percolation is given in the next lemma.
Lemma 26. Let ε > 0 and a12 < 0. Then there exist K large and a cou-
pling of the spatial game with four dependent oriented site percolation such
that
W
1−ε
n ⊂Xn for all n whenever X0 =W1−ε0 and a11 <−max(m1,m2).
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Proof. Combining Lemmas 22, 24 and 25, we obtain
P (η2
√
K ∩B2K 6=∅|η0 ∩BK =∅)
≤ P (Ωin|η0 ∩BK =∅) +P (Ωtr|η0 ∩BK =∅)
≤ P (ηs ∩B4K /∈ S for all s ∈ (0,1)|η0 ∩BK =∅)
+P (Ωin|ηs ∩B4K ∈ S for some s ∈ (0,1)) + P (Ωtr|η0 ∩BK =∅)
≤ ε/3 + ε/3 + ε/3 = ε
for all K large and all a11 < −max(m1,m2). The existence of a coupling
with oriented site percolation then follows from the same arguments as in
the proof of Lemma 17. Note that the comparison can only be made with
four dependent percolation because all the events introduced in the proofs of
Lemmas 22–25 are measurable with respect to the graphical representation
in B4K . 
Repeating the same steps as in the previous two sections, we deduce from
the lemma that strategy 2 survives. To also prove extinction of strategy 1,
we observe that Lemma 25 excludes the existence of transversal paths that
ever intersect B2K by time 2
√
K with probability close to one. In particular,
including this event in our definition of void sites, Lemma 26 still holds for
arbitrarily small ε. Moreover, with this new definition, we obtain that
η2n
√
K ∩ (Kz +BK) 6=∅ implies (w,0)→2 (z,n) for some w ∈ Zd
in the oriented graph H2. Note that this implication is similar to the one in
the proof of Lemma 21 and can be shown using the same idea. Almost sure
extinction of strategy 1 then follows from the lack of percolation of the dry
sites repeating again the steps in the proof of Lemma 21.
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